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Abstract
Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern
in health economics research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse
the inﬂuence of incentives from fee-for-service and capitation payments on physicians’ supply
of medical services. In our experiment, physicians choose quantities of medical services for
patients with diﬀerent states of health. We ﬁnd that physicians provide signiﬁcantly more
services under fee-for-service than under capitation. Patients are overserved under fee-for-
service and underserved under capitation. However, payment incentives are not the only
motivation for physicians’ quantity choices, as patients’ health beneﬁts are of considerable
importance as well. We ﬁnd that patients in need of a high (low) level of medical services
receive a larger health beneﬁt under fee-for-service (capitation).




A central concern in health economics is to understand the inﬂuence of institutions on the be-
haviour of health care markets. Eﬀects from changing institutions like the payment system during
a health care reform are ex ante not necessarily known to policy makers and may inﬂuence be-
haviour in an undesired way. Main addressees of reforms on the supply side are physicians whose
behaviour is likely to be inﬂuenced by the payment system. The theoretical literature highlights
the diﬀerent incentives of commonly used physician payment systems like fee-for-service (FFS) or
capitation (CAP). Under FFS, physicians are paid for each medical procedure or service dispensed
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1to a patient, whereas under CAP, physicians receive a ﬁxed payment for each patient, irrespec-
tive of the quantity of medical services provided. In the former system, there is, in general, an
incentive to deliver more care in order to increase own income. On the contrary, incentives from
CAP can reduce the provision of health services (e.g., Pauly 1990). Moreover, FFS embeds an
incentive to overserve patients, whereas CAP may lead to underprovision of medical services (e.g.,
Ellis and McGuire 1986, McGuire 2000).
Empirical evidence on the impact of payment schemes on physicians’ supply of medical services is
mixed. Some studies support physicians’ responsiveness to payment incentives (e.g., Croxson et al.
2001, Devlina and Sarma 2008). In particular, physicians seem to provide a higher output in FFS
than in CAP schemes (e.g., Gaynor and Gertler 1995). Some studies do not corroborate the strong
link between payment method and physician behaviour, however (e.g., Hurley and Labelle 1995,
Grytten and Sørensen 2001). Causal inferences on the direction and the strength of an eﬀect are
rather diﬃcult, as, for example, many studies vary more than one component of the payment
system simultaneously. Moreover, behavioural data is gathered from country-speciﬁc institutional
settings that are hardly comparable (Gosden et al. 2001).
An empirical method is called for that allows to investigate behaviour in a controlled man-
ner and under ceteris paribus conditions—as a complement to ﬁeld studies and surveys. The
experimental economics method provides the requested features and has been used for studying
behaviour in a wide range of ﬁelds within economics. In areas like industrial organization, public
choice and labour economics controlled laboratory experiments became commonplace (Camerer
2003, Plott and Smith 2008). In health economics, laboratory experimentation is rather in its in-
fancy.1 This is surprising, as Fuchs (2000) already argued ten years ago that incorporating methods
of experimental economics into health economic research might lead to great beneﬁts.2
In the present paper, we follow the research agenda proposed by Fuchs. Our main research
goal is to improve the understanding on how incentives from the payment systems FFS and CAP
inﬂuence physicians’ behaviour by means of a laboratory experiment. We investigate how both
payments systems aﬀect the supply of medical services at the level of the individual physician.
Further, we analyse whether overprovision occurs in FFS and underprovision arises in CAP. We
study whether the patient’s state of health is inﬂuential for the individual physician’s quantity
choices, and what eﬀects the payment system has on the patient health beneﬁt—in particular for
those with diﬀerent health status.
To meet our research goals, we designed an experiment that captures the main features of the
theoretical literature and provides results comparable to ﬁndings of ﬁeld and survey studies.
In our experiment, medical students in the role of physicians choose quantities of medical ser-
vices they want to provide for their patients. The number of patients and their state of health is
given and constant under both FFS and CAP. The quantity a physician (she) chooses for a patient
(he) determines her own proﬁt and the patient’s beneﬁt. When deciding upon the quantity of
medical services for a given patient, the physician knows about the consequential proﬁts and the
patient beneﬁts for all quantity alternatives. The patient beneﬁt is measured in monetary terms
1In a medical decision-making context, the early study by Fan et al. (1998) explores alternative methods for con-
trolling the cost of physician services under global budgeting, Ahlert et al. (2008) and Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen
(2010) explore behavioural diﬀerences between medical students and other subject pools. The experimental studies
by Lèvy-Garboua et al. (2008) and Schram and Sonnemans (2008) analyse issues dealing with health care funding
and health insurance choice.
2In a similar vein, Frank (2007) suggests the application of behavioural economics that help to answer relevant
issues in health economics.
2representing a monetary equivalent of beneﬁts from the provision of medical services. For each
patient, there exists a unique quantity indicating the best treatment for the patient as it renders
the highest beneﬁt to the patient. Optimal quantities vary across patient types. The physician’s
proﬁts increase in the quantity provided under FFS and decrease under CAP. The physician faces
a tradeoﬀ between her own maximal proﬁt and the optimal patient beneﬁt. Patients in our ex-
periment are abstract in that only subjects deciding as physicians take part, and no patients are
present. Physicians’ quantity choices have real consequences for patients outside the lab, however:
the money corresponding to the beneﬁts of the abstract patients is transferred to a charity caring
for real patients. Except for the mode of payment, we kept all experimental parameters constant.
Our main ﬁnding is that physicians’ supply of medical services is aﬀected by the incentives from
the payment systems. Physicians supply about 33% less medical services under CAP than under
FFS. In line with theoretical considerations, patients are overprovided under FFS and underpro-
vided under CAP. Financial incentives—and thus physicians’ proﬁts—are not the only motivation
for their quantity decisions, though. The patient beneﬁt is of considerable importance as well.
However, the patient beneﬁt is aﬀected diﬀerently by the two payment systems; patients in need
of a low level of medical services are better oﬀ under CAP, whereas patients in need of a high level
of medical services gain a higher beneﬁt when physicians are paid by FFS.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of the theoretical
and empirical literature on physician payment and incentives most relevant to our research topic
and provide a rationale for an economic experiment. Section 3 states our research questions. In
Section 4, we present the experimental design and procedure. Section 5 provides the behavioural
results. Section 6 discusses our results and concludes.
2 Related literature and rationale for an experiment
The theoretical literature widely analysed how physicians respond to incentives from payment
schemes (McGuire 2000). In particular, the relationship between incentives from FFS and CAP
and physicians’ supply of medical services has been studied (e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1986, 1990,
Selden 1990). Using a principal-agent framework where the physician is the agent of the hospi-
tal and her supply of medical services is inﬂuential for her own proﬁt and the patient’s health
beneﬁt, Ellis and McGuire (1986) show that FFS embeds an incentive for overprovision whereas
CAP provides an incentive for underprovision of medical services.3 The theoretical analysis in-
cludes the individual patient’s health beneﬁt as a major determinant of physicians’ behaviour (see
also Woodward and Warren-Boulton 1984, Chalkley and Malcomson 1998, Ma and Riordan 2002,
Jack 2005).4 Other authors found that besides causing underprovision of necessary medical ser-
vices (Blomqvist 1991), CAP may lead to cream-skimming of patients with a good state of health
(e.g., Newhouse 1996, Barros 2003).
Evidence from empirical analyses on the impact of payment schemes on physicians’ supply of
medical services is mixed. Note that these studies relate to diﬀerent institutional and country-
speciﬁc settings (e.g., US physician group practice, UK fundholding system) and various measures
of output (e.g., weekly patient visits, number of laboratory tests).
There is empirical evidence that physicians do respond to ﬁnancial incentives (see Hillman et al.
3The applicability of Ellis and McGuire’s model to a primary care setting is discussed by Newhouse (2002).
4Arrow (1963) already emphasised the importance of professional ethics and, thus, departs from a pure proﬁt-
maximizing motive when describing the behaviour of physicians.
31989, Hemenway et al. 1990). Gaynor and Pauly (1990), e.g., ﬁnd that payment incentives aﬀect
the ‘produced’ quantity of medical services in US medical group practices. Gaynor and Gertler
(1995) show that physicians in group practices reduce their eﬀort, i.e., the number of weekly oﬃce
visits, when physicians’ payment is changed from FFS to CAP.
Davidson et al. (1992) observe a similar behavioural pattern for US oﬃce-based primary care
physicians. In their randomized controlled trial, the frequency of visits in a FFS group with high
fees is higher than in a CAP group. Most studies of Health Maintenance Organizations in the
USA ﬁnd that managed care reduces the length of hospital stays, the number of specialist con-
sultations and the number of hospital operations (e.g., Miller and Luft 1994). A main objection
to these studies is, however, that they are unable to disentangle payment incentives and tighter
administrative controls under managed care (Grytten et al. 2009).
Croxson et al. (2001) show evidence for the ﬁnancial incentives of the UK fundholding sys-
tem to have a strong impact on physicians’ behaviour. Before enrolling, physicians intensiﬁed
their hospital-based activity in order to increase their budget for the duration of the fundholding
scheme. After becoming a fundholder, they decreased activities to retain the surplus of the fund.
In a before-and-after study, Krasnik et al. (1990) report that general practitioners in Denmark
respond to a variation from pure lump-sum payments to CAP supplemented by a FFS component
by raising diagnostic and curative services and decreasing referrals to secondary care. Concerning
referral rates, Iversen and Lurås (2000) arrive at a similar result. They ﬁnd referrals from primary
to secondary care revealed by Norwegian general practitioners to be larger under a CAP-system
with a low FFS-component than under a system with a ﬁxed payment (practice allowance com-
ponent) complemented by a FFS-payment. The increase in referrals may, however, not only be
attributable to CAP, but rather to the lower FFS-component. Accounting for possible selection
eﬀects, Sørensen and Grytten (2003) show that primary care physicians in Norway under FFS have
more consultations and patient contacts as well as lower referral rates than salaried physicians.
Dumont et al. (2008) analyse data on primary care services from the Canadian province Que-
bec before and after a variation from FFS to a mixed system with a base wage—independent of
services provided—and a reduced FFS payment. Their results suggest that physicians react to
payment incentives by reducing the volume of services, but increasing the time spent per service
and per non-clinical service under the mixed payment system. Disentangling selection and incen-
tive eﬀects, Devlina and Sarma (2008) ﬁnd that FFS strongly encourages Canadian physicians to
see more patients per week than in alternative payment systems like CAP.
Several studies do not support the strong link between payment incentives and physicians’ sup-
ply of medical services; see Gosden et al. (2001) and Sørensen and Grytten (2003) for summaries.
Hutchinson et al. (1996), for example, do not ﬁnd diﬀerences when comparing hospital utilization
rates in Ontario (Canada) under FFS and CAP. Hurley and Labelle (1995) do not ﬁnd evidence
for a clear-cut response in the provision of medical services among Canadian physicians. After
controlling for characteristics of patients and general practitioners, Grytten and Sørensen (2001)
ﬁnd the impact of payment systems on Norwegian physicians’ behaviour to be rather small.
Field studies face various methodological diﬃculties. Multiple and unobservable inﬂuences on
physicians’ decisions, context and country-speciﬁc institutions and payment system variations make
the generalization and application of results to other health markets rather diﬃcult (Gosden et al.
2001). It is not always clear whether more than one component of the payment system is var-
ied simultaneously or whether the patient characteristics are comparable for the samples under
4study. Only recently, potential selection biases are accounted for (see Sørensen and Grytten 2003,
Grytten et al. 2009). Finally, many ﬁeld studies rely on self-reports (e.g., Gaynor and Gertler 1995,
Devlina and Sarma 2008) not unlikely to diﬀer from actual behaviour (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth
1999).
A laboratory experiment overcomes several of the deﬁciencies mentioned above. We are aware
that this comes at some costs, such as a simpliﬁed experimental design—in reality, a physician’s
decision situation is much more complex, a small number of observations and low incentives.5 Yet,
a laboratory experiment is an important and valuable tool to complement ﬁeld studies for a number
of reasons: the researcher is able to control the decision environment in a way hardly attainable
in a natural setting (see, e.g., Davis and Holt 1993, Falk and Heckman 2009). Behavioural data
are gathered in experimental sessions where only the variable of interest, in our case the payment
method, is varied, providing a true ceteris paribus change. Observed diﬀerences in physician be-
haviour can thus be attributed to the modiﬁcation under study. Participants in experiments are
randomly assigned to the experimental conditions excluding selection biases. Diﬀerent from sur-
vey studies, experimental investigations are based on actual decisions associated with monetary
rewards that are related to the participants’ choices. This is a situation real physicians face in their
daily practice. Finally, laboratory experiments can serve as a ‘wind tunnel’ before institutional
changes are implemented, e.g., during a health care reform.
3 Research questions
Our ﬁrst research question deals with the impact the two payment systems have on individual
physicians’ provision behaviour and the consequences for individual patients. According to theory
and the tendency found in numerous ﬁeld studies (see Section 2), we expect individual physicians
to provide more services under FFS than under CAP. We are also interested in whether individual
physicians’ quantity choices are inﬂuenced by patients’ optimal health states. As tradeoﬀs between
achieving the patient’s optimal quantity and own maximum proﬁt occur and we anticipate physi-
cians to put some positive weight on their proﬁt, we expect overprovision and underprovision of
medical services under FFS and CAP incentives, respectively. Finally, we analyse physicians’ pro-
vision behaviour from the individual patient’s point of view. We explore whether for each patient
the quantity of medical services is higher under FFS than under CAP. We further investigate over-
and underprovision of the individual patient for both modes of payment.
Research Question 1. Do incentives from payment systems FFS and CAP inﬂuence the indi 
vidual physician’s supply of medical services? Are patients overserved under FFS and underserved
under CAP?
Our second research question is concerned with the inﬂuence of patients’ states of health on
the individual physician’s behaviour under both payment systems. Physicians choose quantities of
medical services for patients with diﬀerent states of health—the so-called patient types. Patient
types diﬀer in the number of services needed to obtain the best treatment rendering the optimal
patient beneﬁt. Patients with a good state of health need low quantities, patients with an inter-
mediate (bad) state of health need intermediate (high) quantities. Diﬀerent from ﬁeld studies,
physicians in our experiment treat the same number of patients comprising the same types under
5Falk and Fehr (2003) emphasise that careful experimentation can overcome these problems. For a more general
discussion on laboratory experiments in social sciences, see Falk and Heckman (2009).
5both FFS and CAP. This allows us to investigate the quantity choices at the patient type level.
If individual physicians are inﬂuenced by the patient’s health status, the average medical services
per patient type should correspond to the ascending order of patient optimal quantities. Finally,
we are interested in over- and underprovision at the patient type level.
Research Question 2. Does the patient’s state of health inﬂuence the physicians’ supply of
medical services?
The focus of our third research question is on the consequences of physicians’ behaviour in terms
of patients’ health beneﬁt. We investigate the beneﬁt loss the individual patient suﬀers when a
physician deviates from choosing the patient optimal quantity. One might think that studying
average eﬀects is suﬃcient for a reliable judgment on the impact of a payment system variation.
That this might be premature is shown by results from the RAND health insurance experiment
(e.g., Manning et al. 1987, Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993). Implementing
diﬀerent insurance systems, the authors found that all types of services fell with cost sharing. The
reduced service use had nearly no adverse eﬀect on health for the average person; health among
the sick poor was adversely aﬀected, though. Motivated by this ﬁnding, we expect an impact of
the payment systems on beneﬁt losses for diﬀerent patient types. Due to the incentives inherent in
the two systems, patients with a good state of health will probably suﬀer lower losses under CAP
than under FFS. For those with a bad state of health, we anticipate the reverse.
Research Question 3. Do patients with the same state of health suﬀer diﬀerent beneﬁt losses
across payment systems?
4 Experimental design and procedure
4.1 General design and decision situation
Each participant in our experiment is allocated to a physician’s role and joins the experiment only
once, either in the experimental condition FFS or in CAP. All participants are medical students
supposed to become physicians in the future. We deliberately chose medical students as we expect
them to identify easily with the medical decision context of our experiment.
A physician’s decision task is to choose a quantity of medical services for a given patient whose
health beneﬁt is inﬂuenced by that choice. Physician i decides on the quantity of medical services
q ∈ {0 1       10} for three patient types (j = 1 2 3) with ﬁve abstract illnesses (k = A B  C, D, E)
each. She thus makes 15 decisions. The three types of patients account for a heterogeneous patient
population. Patient types reﬂect the patients’ diﬀerent states of health—good, intermediate, and
bad. The combination of patient type and illness characterizes a speciﬁc patient 1A, 1B, 1C,   ,
3D, 3E. Patient types diﬀer in the health beneﬁt they gain from the medical services (B1k(q),
B2k(q), B3k(q)). The patient health beneﬁt is measured in monetary terms. A physician’s choice
of medical services simultaneously determines the patient beneﬁt and her own proﬁt (πjk(q)). The
patient is assumed to be passive and fully insured, accepting each level of medical service provided
by the physician.
Patients in our experiment are abstract, in that only subjects deciding as physicians take
part and no patients are present. Physicians’ quantity choices have consequences for real patients
outside the lab, however, as the money corresponding to the beneﬁts of the abstract patients
is transferred to the Christoﬀel Blindenmission, a charity caring for real patients. The money
6supported surgical treatments of cataract patients in a hospital in Masvingo (Zimbabwe) staﬀed
by ophthalmologists of the Christoﬀel Blindenmission.6 This feature of our experimental design
implements an incentive for the physicians to take the patient beneﬁt into account.
To illustrate the physicians’ task, Figure 1 provides the decision screen for patient 1E under
Figure 1: Decision screen for patient 1E in FFS
FFS. The physician gets information on her payment, costs and proﬁt, as well as on the patient’s
beneﬁt for each quantity from 0 to 10. All monetary amounts are in Taler, our experimental
currency, the exchange rate being 1 Taler = EUR 0 05. The ﬁrst two columns of the screen
comprise the medical services and the corresponding quantities. The third column indicates the
physician’s payment that increases in the quantity of medical services. Recall that in CAP the
payment remains the same for all quantities, as subjects receive a lump sum per patient (see
instructions in the Appendix). Column 4 shows the costs of medical services that are assumed to
be constant across patient types and conditions. Physician’s proﬁt (payment minus costs) is given
in the ﬁfth column, and the ﬁnal column comprises the patient beneﬁt.
4.2 Parameters
In FFS, physicians receive a fee for each unit of medical services provided; thus, the payment
increases in q. The payment diﬀers with illnesses, i.e., RjA(q) RjB(q)  ... RjE(q). As a guideline
for specifying the payment, we used the German scale of charges and fees for physician services
(Einheitlicher Bewertungsma stab, EBM), in particular the tariﬀs for ophthalmologist services like
the treatment of glaucoma or cataract. Under CAP, physicians are paid a lump sum of 12 Taler
per patient, an amount close to the average maximum proﬁt per patient a subject could achieve
under FFS. See panel I in Table A.1 for an overview of all payment parameters.
Patient beneﬁt Bjk(q) is shown in panel IV of Table A.1. Although the patient beneﬁt varies
6Notice that we did not inform the participants about the money being assigned to a developing country.
7across patient types, a common characteristic of Bjk(q) is a global optimum on the quantity interval
[0 10]. There is a unique quantity q∗
jk yielding the highest beneﬁt to patients of type j for illnesses
k. We use a concave patient beneﬁt function like many theoretical papers (e.g., Ellis and McGuire
1986, Ma 1994, Choné and Ma 2010). The patient optimal quantities are q∗
1k = 5, q∗
2k = 3 and
q∗
3k = 7 for patient types 1, 2, 3, respectively—and, again, are known to the physicians. Taking
q∗
jk as the benchmark for the best medical treatment, we are able to identify overprovision and
underprovision.7
Further parameters relevant for physicians’ decisions are costs cjk(q) and, particularly, proﬁt
πjk(q) shown in panels II and III of Table A.1. Physicians have to bear costs cjk(q) = 1
10 · q2 in
both conditions.8 Proﬁts vary across illnesses in FFS because payment diﬀers, and costs are kept
constant. In CAP, proﬁt is constant across illnesses. In FFS, the proﬁt-maximizing quantity ˆ qjk
is 10 for all patients, except for those with illness A, i.e., patients 1A, 2A and 3A, as ˆ qjA = 5.
For patient 1A, ˆ q1A = q∗
1A = 5. Under CAP, a proﬁt-maximizing subject would not provide any
medical service, i.e., ˆ qjk = 0 for all patients.
4.3 Experimental protocol
Our computerized experiment—programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007)—was conducted at
BonnEconLab, the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Bonn. 42 med-
ical students were recruited via the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004); 20 of them
participated in FFS and 22 in CAP.9
The experimental procedure in both conditions was as follows: upon arrival, subjects were
randomly allocated to the cubicles where they took their decisions in full anonymity. Then, the ex-
perimenter read the instructions aloud. Subjects were given plenty of time for clarifying questions
which were asked and answered in private. To check for subjects’ understanding of the decision
task, they had to answer three test questions. Each participant then made 15 choices on the quan-
tity of medical services. The order of patients to be treated was predetermined and kept constant
across conditions. After the experiment, subjects were paid in private according to their choices.
To validate the actual transfer of the money, we applied a procedure like Eckel and Grossman
(1996). After all subjects had been paid, a monitor randomly selected from the participants veri-
ﬁed that a check on the beneﬁts of all patients was written. The check was sealed in an envelope
addressed to the Christoﬀel Blindenmission. The monitor and experimenter then walked together
to the nearest mailbox and deposited the envelope. The monitor was paid an additional 4 00 EUR
(see also the instructions in the Appendix).
Sessions lasted for 30 to 40 minutes. Subjects on average earned 6 88 EUR in FFS and 7 42 EUR
in CAP.10 In total, 273 68 EUR were transferred to the Christoﬀel Blindenmission, 6 62 EUR per
participant in FFS and 6 42 EUR in CAP. As the average cost for a surgical treatment of cataract
7From a medical point of view, there might be many acceptable treatment variations. This is not addressed in
our simpliﬁed experimental setup. Rather, we assume that a speciﬁc amount of medical services provides the patient
with the optimal health beneﬁt.
8Convex cost functions are assumed in several theoretical models of physician behaviour (e.g., Ma 1994 and
Choné and Ma 2010).
9Medical students who registered in ORSEE for laboratory experiments at BonnEconLab were invited via au-
tomatically generated e-mails to participate in two experimental sessions of our experiment. When signing up,
subjects neither knew anything about the decision task nor about the fact that only medical students were asked to
participate. This procedure guaranteed the random allocation of students to the two experimental conditions and
excluded self-selection into payment schemes.
10Average payoﬀs correspond to the hourly wage of a student helper at the University of Bonn (8 32 EUR). A
lunch at the student cafeteria is around 2 50 EUR.
8patients amounts to about 30 EUR, the money from our experiment allowed to treat nine real
patients.
5 Results
5.1 Physicians’ provision behaviour
Research Question 1 is concerned with the inﬂuence of FFS and CAP on the individual physician’s
choice of medical services and the consequences for individual patients. Before turning to this
analysis, we compare behaviour in FFS and CAP at the aggregate level. The descriptive statistics in
Table 1 show a marked diﬀerence. Overall, physicians provide 33% less medical services under CAP
than under FFS. This corresponds to tendencies reported in ﬁeld studies (e.g., Gaynor and Pauly
1990, Gaynor and Gertler 1995; see also Sørensen and Grytten 2003).
Table 1: Physicians’ quantity choices under FFS and CAP
Payment Mean Median s.d. obs. p
FFS 6.60 7.00 1.85 300 0.0021
CAP 4.40 5.00 1.64 330 0.0105
p-values relate to a two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test compar-
ing qjk with q∗
jk.
The behavioural diﬀerence between payment systems persists when comparing individual
physicians’ quantity choices averaged over all 15 decisions. Physicians under FFS provide highly
signiﬁcantly more medical services than under CAP.11 This already indicates that physicians are
inﬂuenced by payment incentives—and, thus, by their own proﬁt.12
We next investigate over- and underprovision, i.e., providing more or less than the optimal
quantity for the patient. If the individual physician were only motivated by the optimal quantity
for the patient and the payment system had no impact on her choices, she would always choose q∗
jk
under both payment systems. She would end up providing an average (and a median) quantity of 5
medical services. Over- and underprovision would be no issue. Our experimental data disconﬁrms
this conjecture. We found only two physicians in FFS and four physicians in CAP who behave
accordingly (see Table A.2). Thus, in both conditions the number of physicians who deviate in
their choices from the optimal quantity for the patient is signiﬁcantly higher than the number of
those who do not.13
At last, we analyse the impact the average physician’s supply of medical services has for the
individual patient. For both conditions, Figure 2 shows the average quantities of medical services
qjk chosen for each patient jk and the patient optimal quantities q∗
jk allowing to identify over-
and underprovision. In FFS, 13 patients are overserved on average; this is the case for patients
where the proﬁt-maximizing quantity ˆ qjk is larger than q∗
jk.14 We observe a diﬀerent pattern under
CAP. Here, qjk < q∗
jk for 11 patients. Testing over all 15 patients, we ﬁnd that physicians provide
11p = 0 0000, Mann Whitney U-test. All test statistics are two-sided.
12This result is further corroborated when comparing provision behaviour from a patient’s point of view. Here,
qFFS
jk > qCAP
jk for all patients jk. This is highly signiﬁcant (p = 0 0000, Mann-Whitney U test). This result even
persists at an individual decision level. Except for patients 1A and 3A, qFFS
ij > qCAP
ij (p ≤ 0 0010, Mann-Whitney
U test). In FFS, a signiﬁcantly higher number of patients is provided with signiﬁcantly more medical services
compared to CAP (p = 0 0070, binomial test).
13FFS: p = 0 0004; CAP: p = 0 0022, binomial test.
14Patient 1A is treated optimally by all physicians, whereas patient 3A is even underserved.

































medical services signiﬁcantly larger than optimal for patients in FFS and signiﬁcantly lower than
optimal in CAP; for test statistics see Table 1.
Result 1. The individual physician’s supply of medical services is inﬂuenced by the two payment
systems. Physicians provide more services under FFS than under CAP. Patients are overserved
in the former and underserved in the latter.
5.2 Patients’ state of health
Our second research question investigates whether patient types inﬂuence the individual physician’s
supply of medical services. The three patient types in our experiment are characterized by diﬀerent
health states; patients of type 1 (2, 3) need 5 (3, 7) medical services to obtain their optimal beneﬁt
(Table A.1 and Figure 2). If physicians are inﬂuenced by the patient types, but not by the payment
system, they should choose average quantities near or equal to q∗
jk in FFS and in CAP. Descriptive
statistics in Table 2 indicate that this is not the case.
Common across payment systems, however, is the order of average quantities for the three types
Table 2: Physicians’ quantity choices under FFS and CAP by patient type
Payment Variable Mean Median s.d. obs. p
FFS q1k 6.68 6.00 1.80 100 0.0001
q2k 5.96 6.00 2.32 100 0.0001
q3k 7.16 7.00 0.95 100 0.1846
CAP q1k 4.55 5.00 1.33 110 0.0219
q2k 3.11 3.00 0.89 110 0.3042
q3k 5.54 6.00 1.61 110 0.0001
p-values relate to a two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing physi-
cians’ average quantity choices for each patient type j with q∗
jk.
of patients, q2k < q1k < q3k. We now test whether this order is the result of choices systematically
inﬂuenced by the diﬀerent patient types. To this end, we apply an order test (Selten 1967) that
for each physician compares the observed order of average medical services per patient type with
10the perfect ascending order of optimal quantities.15 There are six possibilities to assign the three
ranks. The null hypothesis is that for each subject the order of observed values is arbitrary. For
both payment schemes, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% level.
Next, we check for over- and underprovision when patient types are accounted for. We ﬁnd
adverse eﬀects in both payment systems. Under FFS, patients with an intermediate and a good
health state, i.e., patients of type 1 and 2, are signiﬁcantly overserved (for test statistics, see
Table 2). The average quantity of medical services for patients of type 3 does not statistically
diﬀer from the optimal quantity for the patient, though. Under CAP, patients of types 1 and
3 are signiﬁcantly underserved, whereas average quantities supplied for patient type 2 are not
statistically diﬀerent from being optimal.
Result 2. Patients’ health status systematically inﬂuences physicians’ supply of medical services
in both payment systems, yet in diﬀerent directions. While physicians in FFS overserve patients
in a good and intermediate state of health, physicians in CAP underserve patients in a bad and
intermediate state of health.
5.3 Patient health beneﬁt
Our third research question focusses on how the patient beneﬁt is aﬀected by the payment systems
via the individual physician’s provision behaviour. Our design speciﬁes the patient beneﬁt for
each choice of medical services. We, therefore, can compute the patient beneﬁt loss which is the
amount the individual patient forgoes in his beneﬁt whenever a physician i deviates from choosing
q∗











, the beneﬁt loss relative to the patient beneﬁt at the optimal treatment.
In FFS, the proportional beneﬁt loss averaged over all patients Ljk is almost 10 percent (mean
0 0995, s.d. 0 0860); under CAP, it is slightly larger (mean 0 1291, s.d. 0 2032). These numbers
seem to suggest that the patient beneﬁt loss is not much aﬀected by the payment systems. Yet,
the picture is diﬀerent when focusing on patient types.
Patients with a good health status (patient type 2) experience a signiﬁcantly smaller loss in
Table 3: Proportional beneﬁt loss by patient type
Payment Lj Patient type 1 Patient type 2 Patient type 3
FFS Mean 0.09 0.15 0.06
Median 0.05 0.15 0.05
s.d. 0.11 0.12 0.10
CAP Mean 0.15 0.07 0.17
Median 0.00 0.00 0.05
s.d. 0.28 0.22 0.23
p 0.5445 0.0009 0.1847
p-values relate to a two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test comparing Lj across pay-
ment systems.
15The logic behind the order test is the following. When a physician’s quantity choice is inﬂuenced by patient
types q∗
jk, patients in need of a large (intermediate, low) quantity of medical services should on average receive a
large (intermediate, low) amount of medical treatment. If a physician behaves accordingly, the ranks assigned to




A measure for the diﬀerence between the actual order and the perfect order is the number of inversions, i.e., the
number of pairwise changes necessary to transform the given order into the perfect order. We calculate the average
quantity per patient type for each of those 16 physicians whose observed order comprises three diﬀerent values and
rank them according to their magnitude. For each physician, we then calculate the number of inversions necessary
to achieve the perfect order of ranks.
11health beneﬁt under CAP compared to FFS. On the contrary, for patients with an intermediate
or a bad state of health the proportional patient beneﬁt loss is smaller, although not signiﬁcantly,
under FFS than under CAP. (see Table 3)
Result 3. Payment systems have an adverse eﬀect on patient beneﬁt losses for diﬀerent patient
types. Patients with a good health status suﬀer from a larger beneﬁt loss under FFS than under
CAP. For patients with an intermediate and a bad state of health we ﬁnd the opposite tendency.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we examine the impact of the two payment methods fee-for-service and capitation on
the behaviour of individual physicians. To this end, we introduced a fully incentivized laboratory
experiment and implemented a controlled ceteris paribus change of the payment scheme.
We ﬁnd a marked inﬂuence of the payment system on the individual physician’s behaviour.
Similar to results from ﬁeld studies, physicians in our experiment provide signiﬁcantly more med-
ical services under FFS than under CAP. In line with the theoretical literature, patients in our
experiment are overserved under FFS and underserved under CAP.
Another main insight is that patients’ health status systematically inﬂuences the physician’s
supply of medical services in both payment systems. Yet, the impact points in diﬀerent directions.
While physicians in FFS overserve patients in a good and intermediate state of health, physicians
in CAP underserve patients in a bad and intermediate state of health.
Finally, the individual physician’s decisions are motivated not only by her own proﬁt; the
patients’ health beneﬁt is of considerable importance as well. In both payment schemes, we ﬁnd
rather small average losses in patient beneﬁts due to physicians deviating from the optimal treat-
ment. Even though this result suggests nearly no impact of the payment system on the patient
beneﬁt loss, the picture looks diﬀerent when concentrating on patient types. Patients with a good
state of health suﬀer a larger beneﬁt loss under FFS than CAP, whereas for patients with an
intermediate and a bad health state we ﬁnd the opposite tendency.
Our experimental approach and our ﬁndings might be and have been subject to critical con-
cerns. In the following, we deal with the most important ones like contribution of our study to the
health economics literature, selection bias, and generalizability of our results.16
The results from our laboratory experiment are consistent with related ﬁndings from empirical
health economics studies that use more traditional designs like surveys or controlled trials (see our
literature review in Section 2). One, therefore, might wonder about the contribution of our study
to the literature. For one thing, we think it is noteworthy that our simpliﬁed experimental setting
is able to generate results in line with ﬁndings from outside the lab. Not only for that reason, the
experimental method seems a valuable research tool and an ideal complement to other empirical
methods.
Moreover, our laboratory experiment provides additional features that are diﬃcult to ﬁnd in
the ﬁeld. To start with, we are able to test theoretical predictions on overprovision in FFS and
underprovision in CAP (e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1986) in that the optimal patient beneﬁt could
be speciﬁed in the experiment. In fact, our results are in line with these predictions. Testing for
over- and underprovision is hardly possible outside the lab as the required data are usually not
available. Second, we compare behaviour under true ceteris paribus conditions as only the payment
16We thank an anonymous referee for raising these issues.
12system is changed; patient characteristics and the number of patients stay constant, a situation
hardly warranted in the ﬁeld. Third, the lab experiment enables thorough robustness checks of
the ﬁndings because it can be repeated by diﬀerent scientists under exactly the same conditions.
Running the same design in diﬀerent countries facilitates cross-country comparability as it allows
to dispense with country-speciﬁc institutions. Fourth, by random assignment of participants to
experimental conditions, the self-selection bias of physicians into payment systems is avoided from
the outset. Grytten et al. (2009), for instance, argue that a random allocation of physicians to
payment schemes, although an ideal design, is diﬃcult to do in practice. Finally, a laboratory
experiment requires much less time and ﬁnancial means than many other empirical methods. It
might have great potential as ‘test bed’ before large-scale studies or institutional changes of the
health care market are planned.
One might argue that the medical students who participate in our experiment are the ones
most interested in earning money. This might lead to an overestimation of the payment eﬀect
as these students strive for higher proﬁts than non-participating medical students less driven by
ﬁnancial incentives. We cannot completely rule out such a bias as we have no information on
the characteristics and likely behaviour of non-participants. Some studies, however, suggest the
potential bias to be negligible. Falk et al. (2010) compare pro-social behaviour of a large student
subject pool with a subset of students who take part in experiments. The authors do not ﬁnd
evidence for statistical diﬀerences between participants and non-participants; see also Cubitt et al.
(forthcoming) for related ﬁndings. Our own data also suggest that it is not the most proﬁt-oriented
medical students who participate in our experiment. Patients, on average, only suﬀer mild losses of
their health beneﬁt due to non-optimal quantity choices. The mean fraction of proﬁt-maximizing
choices is only 8%, and no physician always goes for her maximal proﬁt. If only the most proﬁt-
oriented medical students had participated in our experiment we would have observed much more
egoistic behaviour. A comparison of medical and non-medical students actually showed that the
former were signiﬁcantly less proﬁt-oriented than the latter (Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen 2010).
Another point of concern might relate to the generalizability of our ﬁndings to the clinical
setting where real physicians have to focus on the medical condition and characteristics of real
patients; medical students have neither the knowledge nor the experience of qualiﬁed physicians.
The main goal of our study is to isolate the causal relationship between change in the payment sys-
tem and the individual physician’s behaviour; see also the general discussion by Falk and Heckman
(2009). To this end, all factors potentially inﬂuencing behaviour other than the payment system
are held constant. Guided by the theoretical models, we simpliﬁed the experimental design and
speciﬁed patient types, optimal treatment and abstract illnesses. Abstracting from a clinical envi-
ronment in this way, to us, is an advantage rather than a deﬁciency as the participating medical
students need not worry about the speciﬁc medical services or how to combine them for treating
a patient optimally. We are aware that the present experiment only allows us to draw qualitative
conclusions and not to assess actual behaviour in a real clinical setting. We have to leave the
analysis of other factors relevant for physicians’ behaviour to future research.
A further simpliﬁcation is how we incorporate the patient in our experiment—we express the
patient beneﬁt in monetary terms. By this device, we included a real incentive to care for a patient
as the physician’s decision is consequential for the medical treatment of real patients outside the
lab. The patients and their beneﬁt actually were a major determinant of subjects’ decisions as
mentioned by almost all participants when answering open questions after the experiment.
13What can we say about policy implications of our ﬁndings having in mind the qualitative na-
ture of our conclusions? In a situation as speciﬁed by our experimental design, a third-party payer
would have to bear 16% more costs to remunerate a physician in FFS than in CAP. From a pure
expenditure point of view, CAP would be, thus, the preferable payment system to be implemented.
Yet, we also found that patients are aﬀected diﬀerently by both payment systems: patients in need
of a low level of medical services are better oﬀ under CAP, whereas patients with a high need of
medical services are better oﬀ under FFS. These ﬁndings reveal a tension on how remuneration
costs and beneﬁt gains and losses are to be weighed against each other. We as scientists do not
feel competent to make recommendations which payment scheme should actually be implemented.
This is rather a matter of political decision-makers’ preferences and priorities.
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A Tables
17Table A.1: Experimental parameters
Quantity (q)
Condition Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I FFS RjA(q) 0.00 1.70 3.40 5.10 5.80 10.50 11.00 12.10 13.50 14.90 16.60
RjB(q) 0.00 1.00 2.40 3.50 8.00 8.40 9.40 16.00 18.00 20.00 22.50
RjC(q) 0.00 1.80 3.60 5.40 7.20 9.00 10.80 12.60 14.40 16.20 18.30
RjD(q) 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.20 15.00 16.90 18.90 21.30 23.60
RjE(q) 0.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 6.70 7.60 11.00 12.30 18.00 20.50 23.00
CAP Rjk(q) 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
II FFS, CAP cjk(q) 0.00 0.10 0.40 0.90 1.60 2.50 3.60 4.90 6.40 8.10 10.00
III FFS πjA(q) 0.00 1.60 3.00 4.20 4.20 8.00 7.40 7.20 7.10 6.80 6.60
πjB(q) 0.00 0.90 2.00 2.60 6.40 5.90 5.80 11.10 11.60 11.90 12.50
πjC(q) 0.00 1.70 3.20 4.50 5.60 6.50 7.20 7.70 8.00 8.10 8.30
πjD(q) 0.00 1.90 3.60 5.10 6.40 5.50 11.40 12.00 12.50 13.20 13.60
πjE(q) 0.00 0.90 1.60 5.10 5.10 5.10 7.40 7.40 11.60 12.40 13.00
CAP πjk(q) 12.00 11.90 11.60 11.10 10.40 9.50 8.40 7.10 5.60 3.90 2.00
IV FFS, CAP B1k(q) 0.00 0.75 1.50 2.00 7.00 10.00 9.50 9.00 8.50 8.00 7.50
B2k(q) 0.00 1.00 1.50 10.00 9.50 9.00 8.50 8.00 7.50 7.00 6.50
B3k(q) 0.00 0.75 2.20 4.05 6.00 7.75 9.00 9.45 8.80 6.75 3.00
This table shows all experimental parameters. Rjk(q) denotes physicians’ payment for patient type j and illness k. Under FFS,
Rjk(q) varies with illnesses k and increases in q, whereas under CAP, Rjk(q) remains constant. The costs for providing medical
services cjk(q) increase in q and are the same under FFS and CAP. Physicians’ proﬁt πjk(q) is equal to Rjk(q) − cjk(q). Bjk(q)
denotes the patient beneﬁt for the three patient types j = 1 2 3 held constant across payment systems. Notice that due to a display
error on the computerized decision screens, RjA(4) = 8 40 instead of 5 80 was shown in FFS. Physicians’ proﬁts were displayed
correctly, however.
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8Table A.2: Individual physicians’ choices of medical services under FFS and CAP
FFS CAP
Physician Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d.
1 6.40 7.00 1.12 4.20 5.00 1.52
2 7.73 8.00 1.87 4.27 5.00 0.88
3 5.00 5.00 1.46 4.80 5.00 1.47
4 5.00 5.00 1.69* 5.13 5.00 1.60
5 7.27 8.00 1.16 2.13 2.00 0.83
6 6.40 6.00 1.12 5.00 5.00 1.69*
7 7.13 7.00 1.06 4.07 4.00 0.96
8 8.27 9.00 1.94 4.33 5.00 0.98
9 6.07 7.00 1.39 4.07 4.00 0.80
10 7.67 7.00 1.76 5.00 5.00 1.69*
11 7.47 8.00 2.00 4.93 5.00 1.62
12 6.93 7.00 1.75 4.93 5.00 1.62
13 6.13 6.00 1.92 2.40 2.00 1.18
14 6.27 7.00 1.33 5.00 5.00 1.69*
15 8.53 9.00 1.96 4.00 4.00 0.85
16 6.67 6.00 1.54 4.47 5.00 1.85
17 5.00 5.00 1.69* 3.40 4.00 1.68
18 5.73 6.00 1.49 4.53 5.00 1.19
19 7.00 7.00 1.25 6.00 6.00 2.45
20 5.33 5.00 1.45 4.67 5.00 1.29
21 . . . 5.00 5.00 1.69*
22 . . . 4.47 5.00 1.13
Overall 6.60 7.00 1.85 4.40 5.00 1.64




In the following experiment, you will make several decisions. Following the instructions and depend-
ing on your decisions, you can earn money. It is therefore very important to read the instructions
carefully.
You take your decisions anonymously in your cubicle on your computer screen. During the
experiment you are not allowed to talk to any other participant. Whenever you have a question,
please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your question in private in your cubicle. If
you disregard these rules you can be excluded from the experiment without receiving any payment.
All amounts of money in the experiment are stated in Taler. At the end of the experiment,
your earnings will be converted into Euro at an exchange rate of 1 Taler = 0.05 EUR and paid to
you in cash.
Your decisions in the experiment
During the entire experiment you are in the role of a physician. You have to decide on the treat-
ment of 15 patients. All participants of this experiment are taking their decisions in the role of a
physician. You decide on the quantity of medical services you want to provide for a given illness
of a patient.
You decide on your computer screen where ﬁve diﬀerent illnesses—A, B, C, D and E—of three
diﬀerent patient types—1, 2 and 3—will be shown one after another. For each patient, you can
provide 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or 10 medical services.
Your payment is as follows:
• Condition FFS:
A diﬀerent payment is assigned to each quantity of medical services. The payment in-
creases in the quantity of medical services.
• Condition CAP:
For each patient you receive a lump-sum payment that is independent of the quantity of
medical services.
While deciding on the quantity of medical services, in addition to your payment you determine
the costs you incur when providing these services. Costs increase with increasing quantity
provided. Your profit in Taler is calculated by subtracting your costs from your payment.
A certain beneﬁt for the patient is assigned to each quantity of medical services, the patient
benefit that the patient gains from your provision of services (treatment). Therefore, your de-
cision on the quantity of medical services not only determines your own profit, but also the
patient benefit. An example for a decision situation is given on the following screen.
20Screen shot FFS
Screen shot CAP
You decide on the quantity of medical services on your computer screen by typing an integer
between 0 and 10 into the box named “Your Decision”.
There are no real patients participating in this experiment, but abstract ones. Yet, the patient
benefit an abstract patient receives by your providing medical services will be beneﬁcial for a real
patient. The total amount corresponding to the sum over all 15 patient benefits determined
by your decisions will be transferred to the charity Christoﬀel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V.,
64625 Bensheim, to support an ophthalmic hospital where patients with cataract are treated.
Earnings in the experiment
After having made your 15 decisions, your overall earnings will be calculated by summing up the
21profits from all your decisions. This amount will be converted from Taler into Euro at the end
of the experiment.
The overall patient benefit resulting from your 15 quantity decisions will be converted into
Euro as well and will be transferred to the Christoﬀel Blindenmission. The transferral will be
made by the experimenter and a monitor. The monitor writes a check on the amount of money
corresponding to the aggregated patient benefits of this experiment. This check issued to the
Christoﬀel Blindenmission will be sealed in an envelope addressed to this charity. The monitor
and experimenter then walk together to the nearest mailbox and deposit the envelope.
After all participants have taken their decisions, one participant is randomly assigned the role
of the monitor. The monitor receives a payment of 4 EUR in addition to the payment from the
experiment. The monitor veriﬁes, by a signed statement, that the procedure described above
was actually carried out. Next, please answer some questions familiarizing you with the decision
situation. After your 15 decisions, please answer some further questions on your screen.
22